Senate Reform for the Global Economy: Introduction

“Every man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome”. –Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 70

WE live in a time very much similar to beginning of the 20^th century; then, industrial forces were rapidly changing (as seen in the industrial revolution and the rise of the Western nation-state) in ways that parallel our current level of economic transformations. Every day we witness the world shrink as these changes have brought the imminent globalization of our economic markets – and necessarily the emergence of our global society. Reason concludes and history shows that agency structures, legislated in 1913 and intended to combat similar economic changes from a century ago, cannot apply in our world. These are forces that our society, as with any advanced society, must account for; otherwise rhetorical slander disseminated by a privileged class, could easily undermine the Constitutionally enforced obligation between public representatives and public authority. Because the United States is (arguably) the current hegemon of the international system, its behavior will unavoidably have a great deal of influence on the development of our emerging global society. America, therefore, is largely responsible for securing our community’s liberty of self-government; a liberty essential to human rights (individual liberties) and the sustainability of collective progress and the better way of life that it usually creates. Failure will render our attempt at reaching the ideal another chapter in history textbooks, and future citizens, enlightened as they will be, will think, “almost” or “nice try” in the same way that Athenian and Roman democracy is generally perceived today.

Prudence dictates that blaming these obstacles on a scapegoat is counter-productive; in fact creating collective blame benefits such regimes by diverting public concern away from already translucent issues of structural change. This is a signifying behavior of despotic government, as seen in Hitler’s use of the final solution while attempting to revive the German economy. This and the subsequent posts aim to prove that socio-economic changes have rendered the U.S. Senate corrupt, in need of reform, and that any legislative action must represent the people’s will. Only after we understand the meaning of civilization, and how progress relates to the changes that accompany civilized life, can we rationally amend for these problems. We cannot achieve such an understanding until we comprehend what it means to be a republic, a representative, and a federal Senator. Once such knowledge is acquired, however, we can appropriately deal with any uncertainties and obstacles that arise from living and increasingly chaotic world, for together we are strong.

Integrity is a mandatory quality for any representational government because such a government transfers collective authority to individual agents, and indeed Garrison affirms that “the idea that public office is a public trust, derived from the people and answerable to the people” (228). Moreover, Garrison’s work is an argument for the first Senate reformation; he contends that the breakdown of trust between Senators and their constituents engendered a corrupting effect on the entire federal system, and most prevalently on the Senate. As public faith dissolved, the Senate went from “a model of legislative dignity, capacity, and behavior” made up of “the class competent to govern” to a “medley of millionaires, ‘bosses,’ and the representatives of selfish interests” (228). This breakdown prolonged party existence, produced artificial divisions in local matters, and made party felicity, not competence, honesty or patriotism the credential for office holding. This directly preceded and contributed to the “growth of machine rule, the purchasability of senatorships, and the decline of the Federal Senate to what we now see it…” (228). Widespread public distrust is a product of inefficient agency relations, because agency relaxations are derived from bureaucratic structures defined in a social contract. Bureaucratic structuring defines Senatorial duties and personnel, but sometimes require revisions if the relevant socio-political climate dictates such a necessity. Senatorial re-structuring has successfully occurred before; most notably seen in the legislations of 1913, which restored Senatorial trust by defining and aligning new agency relations in a way that allowed the nation to recreate a sustainable, relatively long term and productively efficient economic system.

Adjusting constitutional policy is not revolutionary by nature, as peaceful methods for amending the Constitution are explicitly provided for in the social contract. Our founders learned that, on occasion, legislative bylaws need to be re-written such that our invaluable republican principles are not usurped by a corrupting or otherwise tyrannical agent or class. The authors of the Constitution lived in a time when collective social progress rendered older and deeply indoctrinated social norms obsolete. They experienced firsthand the discomfort of unfavorable social regimes; regimes caused by unresolved issues of outdated agency relations, and perpetuated by the increasing emergence of self-interested political corruption. When corruption proliferates to the point that individual or communal liberties are violated in legislation, violent struggle and extremist factions become more prevalent. They saw, as we do now, reform as a matter of necessity – we reform bureaucratic procedure to prevent the rise of a tyranny, it is a matter of individual and national security.

A common misconception is that our Senate is merely “a club of millionaires,” and these are often the grounds upon which Senators are accused of corruption. However, examination will show that “such a consummation would not have displeased…the framers of the Constitution” (Garrison 226). Moreover, it is the violation of Senatorial trust, as was the case 100 years ago, that is the root of today’s congressional issues. Unsurprisingly this corruption has precipitated similar effects, including: the aggrandizement of parties, the growth of machine rule, the purchasability of senatorships, and most importantly, the loss of competence, honest, and patriotism in our representatives (Garrison 228). Today we see issues such as rigid, bipolar, nearly un-crossable party lines; examples of attempts to sell vacant seats; and evidence that a large percentage of Senators engage in highly profitable insider trading, which far, almost inconceivably, exceeds the returns of a normal investor (Ziobrowski, Cheng, and Boyd). (Conveniently, insider trading is not illegal for Senators.)

-Wealthy Americans